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Summary findings
The Uruguay Round will gelnerallv  hlave  a limited impact  level of applied tariffs is in most cases relatively small.
on Egyptian policies affecting goods, invesmnienr,  and  This constitutes a level of commitment that substantially
services. It will have a more significant impact on  exceeds the developing country average.
intellectual property,  although this will take up to a  The government is negotiating a more far-reaching
decade to materialize fully.  agreement with the European Union to liberalize trade
Insofar as this reflects a continuing defensiveness  on a reciprocal basis. Commitments by Egypt in the
against liberalization, it does not bode well for a country  Uruguay Round can be seen as facilitating
that will be facing growing competitive pressures as the  implementation of a Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement.
world economy becomes more inregrated. But Egypt's  Such an agreement could facilitate further
Uruguay Round commitments do, to a large extent, lock  nondiscriminatory  liberalization of Egypt's trade regime.
in the policy changes pursued by dhe government since  Of particular  importance in this connection is opening
the late 1980s. In this respect, they are qu!te significant.  service markets to greater competition, where much
Maximum tariffs have been established for ahlmost  all  remains to be done.
tariff lines, and the gap between these "bindings" and the
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(1995).  The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund.1.  Introduction
Until recently, multilateral trade negotiations  held under auspices of the General Agreement  on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  involved  primarily industrialized  nations, reflecting  the decision on the part
of most developing countries to  demand "special and differential" treatment.  This implied that
reciprocal  concessions  were not offered  in GATT negotiations,  with the result that these mostly centered
on topics (products) of interest to industrialized  countries.  Developing countries' stance towards the
GATT changed in the 1980s, under the influence of the debt crisis, the demonstration effect of the
benefits of the neutral, export oriented strategy taken by the dynamic economies of South-east Asia,
and the collapse of central planning.  As national trade policies became more liberal and the interest
in obtaining better access to industrialized country markets expanded, the willingness to engage in
reciprocal bargaining in the GATT forum increased.  This was reflected in the greatly increased
participation by developing countries in the Uruguay Round.
Egypt has always played a prominent role in the GATT. It participated  actively in the Uruguay
Round and made a number of commitments. As was the case with many developing countries, Egypt
pursued unilateral liberalization concurrently with the Uruguay Round under programs supported by
the World bank (the ERSAP) and the International Monetary Fund (the Standby and EFF).  These
unilateral efforts were a key factor allowing Egypt to be fully involved in the negotiations.
Whether and to what extent Egypt will benefit from the full implementation of the Uruguay
Round package  is difficult to say, although  this paper makes an attempt at assessing the impact in some
areas.  There are a number of uncertainties: transition periods for the abolition of the MFA and
agricultural liberalization  by OECD countries are relatively  long, and tariffs on these items will remain
high for the foreseeable future.  Conversely, against the small market access gains--especially if
discounted  for the length  of the transition--Egypt  could be confronted  with transitional costs associated
with the implementation  of the TRIPs Agreement.  As a net food importing country, Egypt may also
be confronted  with an adverse terms of trade shock if global prices for certain agricultural  commodities
rise following  the reduction  in OECD subsidization. More generally, the significance  of greater access
to export markets granted by industrialized  countries will depend importantly on the use that is made
of instruments of contingent protection such as antidumping.  Not much was achieved in terms of
disciplining the use of such policies.
Partly as a  result of such uncertainties/issues, many Mediterranean countries are actively
pursuing the offer of the European Union (EU) to negotiate free trade agreements.  Such a Euro-
Mediterranean  Agreement (EMA)  may allow Egypt to reduce the threat of EU contingent protection--a
major trading partner--and facilitate further liberalization of the trade regime.  General recognition
exists that such liberalization is necessary.  The world economy is becoming increasingly  integrated,
with trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) more often being complements  than substitutes. Given
the pursuit of liberal and market-oriented  regulatory regimes in many parts of the developing world,
including Eastern Europe and parts of Central Asia, it has become a matter of some urgency that
countries such as Egypt do not lag too far behind. Given the political desire to gradually liberalize  the
economy, an agreement with the EU offers one way to credibly commit to far-reaching reform over
a long transition  path.  The commitments  that were made in the Uruguay  Round by Egypt can be seen
as facilitating  the move towards an EMA.
This paper discusses the results of the Uruguay Round for Egypt, explicitly  taking into account
the Government's decision to negotiate a more far-reaching economic agreement with the EU.  It is
structured as follows.  Section 2 provides an assessment of Egypt's market access commitments in
1industry and agriculture.  Sections 3, 4  and 5  focus on intellectual property rights, trade-related
investment  measures, and services, respectively.  They summarize  the main elements of the disciplines
as they will impact on Egypt.  All three issues are not only important topics in themselves, but are
likely to play a key role in the EMA context. To a large extent Egyptian commitments  in these areas
establish the point of departure for the EMA.  Section 6 briefly surveys the areas where multilateral
disciplines are weak or non-existent, and the possible role of an EMA as opposed to the WTO in
addressing these lacunae.  Section 7 concludes.
2.  Impact  of Market  Access Cornmitments in Manufacturing and Agriculture
1.  Egypt's market access commitments
(a)  Tariff Bindings:  At the heart of a country's liberalization commitments in the WTO are
tariff bindings, which are commitments by a member not to raise its tariffs beyond "bound" levels
without consulting and/or compensatingl/  its trading partners.  A  binding contributes to  greater
predictability of trade policies and hence to greater certainty in trade and investment decisions that
depend on these policies.  As argued by Francois and Martin (1994), tariff bindings can also lead to
significant improvements  in market access conditions  by simply truncating  the range of protection  that
is permissible.2/
Prior to the Uruguay Round, Egypt had bindings on about 3 percent of tariff lines.3/  During
the Round, Egypt agreed to bind 100 percent of its tariff lines in agriculture (as was required of all
countries); and about 97 percent of its Harmonized System (HS) 4-digit tariff lines (1,015 out of 1,046)
in the industrial  sector (Table 1). This is a significant step forward in terms of Egypt's integration into
the trading system compared both to the past, but also to other developing countries which bound on
average only about 73 percent of their tariff lines in industry.4/  In terms of bindings, Egypt's
commitments  approach those of many OECD countries. This should provide some insurance against
future reversal of trade policy, yielding efficiency  benefits domestically and market access benefits to
Egypt's trading partners.
Under the Uruguay Round, countries were also required to "bind" any other duties and charges
applied to imports and list these in their Uruguay Round tariff schedules. Egypt has inscribed only a
few other duties and charges on agricultural goods in its schedule, effectively committing itself to a
relatively transparent tariff regime.5/  It should also be noted that, unlike some industrial countries,
Egypt's tariff schedule has very few specific tariffs (on only 14 tariff lines), all relating to cigarettes
and tobacco-related  products.  This too should contribute to a more transparent trade regime.
I/  Compensation  usually  involves  lowering  other  tariffs to offset  tariffs  that have  been increased.
2/  Much  depends  in  this  connection  on  the holes  and  loopholes  in  the multilateral  agreement  that  allow  for the
imposition  of protection  in particular  circumstances.
3/  Although  Egypt  had bound  about 15  percent  of its tariff  lines  prior to 1990,  the tariffs  announced  in 1991
exceeded  the bound  rates on a number  of tariff lines,  effectively  reducing  the extent  of real  bindings.
4/  The 73 percent  refers  to  the average  of 26 developing  countries  included  in  the WTO  Integrated  Database.
5/  Egypt  does,  however,  levy  a customs  user fee (some  times  called  an import  surcharge)  at rates  of 2 and  5
percent. The  status  of this fee/charge  in light  of the Round  and  Egypt's  market  access  commitments  is unclear.
2After full implementation  of Uruguay Round commitments  in 2005, Egypt's final bound tariffs
will average about 62 percent in agriculture, 32 percent in industry, and about 37 percent overall  (Table
1).1/  The average bound tariff  in 2005  will be greater than the current applied tariff  by about
5 percentage  points in both agriculture and industry.  However, if Egypt successfully implements its
current program of tariff reform, by the end of December 1995, the margin between the future bound
tariff and the applied tariff will be about 11 percentage points in both agriculture and industry.  The
implication  is that, on average, the "water in the bound  tariff"--the margin for Egypt to raise its applied
tariff without  breaching its Uruguay  Round commitments--will  be about 11 percentage  points. This is
in contrast to many other developing countries which have a much larger gap between bound and
applied tariffs.2/  Ideally, the bound tariff should be equal to the applied tariff, which would enhance
the locking-in effect of tariff bindings.  Although Egypt is still far away from this ideal, it has
nevertheless reduced its margin for reversing trade liberalization  by binding its tariffs at "reasonable"
levels.
How much incremental  tariff liberalization is implied by Uruguay Round commitments? True
liberalization  occurs if the applied rate at the end of the current reform in December 1995 is greater
than the final bound rate.  This will be the case for about 10 percent of all tariff lines (excluding the
textiles and clothing sector).  For these lines, the average tariff reduction was about 11 percentage
points, with slightly larger tariff reductions in the industrial sector, yielding average price reductions
in the domestic  market of about 6 percent (Table 1).  Thus, Egypt's Uruguay Round commitments  will
lead to some, albeit limited, incremental  liberalization.
While the gap between  bound and applied tariffs is not unduly large, the level of applied tariffs
remains high.  The current unweighted average tariff is about 27 percent for industry, 56 percent in
agriculture, and 32 percent overall (including  beverages). Even if the current program of tariff reform
is completed,  tariff levels  will remain very high. The average tariff in many other developing  countries
does not exceed 15 percent (Hoekman, 1995a). Maintaining such high rates impose significant costs
on  the Egyptian economy in  terms of  lost consumer welfare, anti-export bias,  and  rent-seeking
opportunities.  As discussed below, it also implies that the trade diversion costs of a  free trade
agreement  with the EU could be substantial.
(b)  Ouantitative restrictions on imports:  Under the Round, Egypt (like all  countries) has
committed to eliminate all quantitative restrictions (QRs) on agricultural imports  However, QRs
existed only selected  poultry products, which were expected  to be eliminated in any event.  In addition,
Egypt has committed to eliminating QRs on 95 4-digit tariff lines in the textiles and clothing sector,
which account  for about 8 percent of all tariff lines. These restrictions will be eliminated over a 5-year
period for textiles and a 10-year  period for clothing. Thus, it is expected  that no QRs (except for those
maintained on  health  and  security  grounds)  will  remain  at  the  end  of  the  Uruguay  Round
implementation  period.
1/  In addition  to specifying  final bound  tariffs, Egypt's schedules  also contain the sequencing  of tariff
reductions. For industrial  products  other  than textiles  and clothing,  the initial  bound  tariff is (f+10) percent
(where  f is the final bound  tariff), which  is reduced  in five equal  annual  installments;  for textile  and  clothing
products,  the initial  bound  tariff is (f+30) percent,  reduced  over  ten years in  equal  installments.  In agriculture,
the initial  bound  tariff  is specified  in the schedule  and  will  be reduced  over  ten years  in  equal  annual  installments.
2/  See  Table 5 in Harmsen  and Subramanian  (1994).
32.  Effect of Uruguav Round on Egvpt's food imports
Egypt is a large net food importer.  Its key agricultural imports comprise wheat, flour, maize,
edible oil, sugar, animal fats, and tea (Table 2).  In 1993/94, imports of these items together exceeded
$1.2 billion.  Egypt had a key role in the Uruguay Round negotiations in seeking recognition of the
possibility that terms of trade losses could be inflicted on net food importers, and in calling for steps
to mitigate such losses. Table 2 shows  the quantitative  impact  of estimated  changes on the food import
bill. I/  For some of Egypt's imports (for example, edible oil, tea, and animal fats) food prices are
expected to fall.  Under the more adverse scenario, total food imports are likely to be $26 million
higher in 2001/02 (measured in 1993/94 U.S. dollars or $32.8 million measured in 2001/02 dollars)
than they would otherwise have been.  This represents  about 2.0 percent of total food imports (about
0.3 percent of total imports) in 1993/94. Under the alternative scenario, food imports are likely to be
negligibly  higher because of the Uruguay  Round than otherwise. In the intervening years, (i.e., up to
2001/02), the impact is likely to be insignificant.2/
3.  Impact on Egypt's exports of liberalization by partner countries
Three market access effects will bear upon Egypt's exports: those from MFN tariff cuts, those
from loss of preferential  margins due to MFN tariff cuts, and those from the liberalization  of the MFA.
The estimated results of these three effects on exports are summarized in the memorandum items of
Tables 3-5.3/  They indicate that the most important impact of the Uruguay Round will derive from
the liberalization  of textiles and clothing quotas.  In 2005, exports of these items to the United States
and the EU will be about $218 million (based on average 1990-92  values) higher than in the absence
of the Round.  Of this increase, about 76 percent ($165 million) will be accounted  for by exports to
the EU and the remainder by exports to the United States.
Egypt's exports under non-preferential  conditions  accounts  for about 38 percent of total non-oil
exports to the three markets covered in the analysis. This share is greatest in the U.S. market (about
84 percent), followed by Japan (57 percent) and the EU (about 27 percent) where Egypt's exports are
predominantly  accounted  for by textiles and clothing products (Yeats, 1994).  In general, the benefits
from MFN tariff reductions  are quite small not only because of the extent of preferential access, but
also because  of the limited nature of tariff cuts.  For example, in the EU market the weighted average
price  reductions stemming from MFN  tariff  cuts are  1.2 percent compared with  reductions of
3.2 percent on products that benefit from preferences.  In aggregate, MFN  tariff reductions are
predicted to lead to increased exports of about $4 million (or about 1.3 percent of non-preferential
exports to the three major markets).
1/ The impact  is analyzed  under  two  scenarios. Under  the adverse  scenario  (scenario  II),  food  price  rises  are
generally  higher  than  the alternative  scenario  (scenario  I) because  the liberalization  attributed  to the Round  is
greater;  this  results  from  the assumption  that  in the absence  of the Round,  levels  of agricultural  protection  would
have  been  the  average  level  prevailing  between  1991  and  1993.  Under  the alternative  scenario,  the counterfactual
is that such  protection  levels  would  have  been  the average  level  between  1982  and 1993.
2/  Higher  food  costs,  which  will  be borne  by consumers,  are likely  to increase  gradually  as liberalization  by
the major  producing  countries  is phased  in over the six-year  implementation  period.
3/  These  effects  are  based  on  very  simple  partial  equilibrium  models,  and  should  be treated  with  caution. For
details  see Shiells,  Subramanian,  and Uimonen  (1995),
4Preferential exports account for about 13 percent of total non-oil exports to the three major
markets covered in the analysis.  I/  While the reduction in preferential margins is larger than the MFN
tariff reductions, the loss in exports in the three major markets due to this effect is estimated at about
$2 million (or 2 percent of preferential exports).  Thus, excluding textiles and clothing, the loss in
exports from the erosion in preference margins is outweighed  by the gains from tariff reductions on
items subject to MFN trade, although  the difference is insignificant  and both effects are very small.
3.  Intellectual Property  Rights2/
A major result of the Uruguay  Round was the Agreement  on Trade Related Intellectual  Property
Rights (TRIPs).  Protection of intellectual  property (IP) has become increasingly prominent in policy
dialogue recent years, and can also be expected to figure in any trade agreement with the EU.  This
section summarizes some of the key  provisions of the  TRIPs agreement and  discusses possible
implications  for Egypt.
1.  TRIPs in a Nutshell
(a) General obligations: The most important general obligation  under the TRIPs agreement is
national treatment, which requires all members to treat nationals of other countries no less favorably
than their own nationals on all IP matters-standards,  enforcement,  and acquisition-subject to certain
exceptions (Article 3).  This obligation is not likely to require legislative changes, as most countries,
including  Egypt, already grant national treatment in their domestic laws.3/
(b) Patents:  Perhaps the most difficult issue in the negotiations was the demand to provide
protection for pharmaceutical  products. It was in this sector that patent regimes differed most starkly,
with several developing countries such as Egypt providing very little or virtually no protection for
pharmaceutical products, while industrial countries had strong patent regimes and were seeking to
further strengthen them by increasing the term of protection.
Under TRIPs,  no  field of technology can be  excluded from patent protection, effectively
disallowing any exemption for pharmaceuticals  from protection (Article 27.1).  Further, all countries
have to provide a minimum term of protection of 20 years (Article 33).  There is also a tight non-
discrimination  provision (Article 27.1) that would have important economic implications: it would
disallow discrimination in the grant of protection (such as certain features of the US first-to-invent
system), it would prevent more permissive rules for compulsory licensing  in the pharmaceutical  sector,
1/  Although  preferential  exports  to the EU are lower in the simulation  exercise  than that reported  in the
SMART  database,  the latter is recognized  as overstating  the extent  of preferential  treatment. This  is because
quotas  or ceilings  may be applied  to products  receiving  GSP treatment,  with  normal  MFN rates applying  to
exports  above  these  ceilings.
2/  This  section  draws  heavily  on Subramanian  (1  995a, 1995b).  For an overview  of the issues  and  the  outcome
of negotiations,  see also  Primo  Braga  (1995).
3/  The second  general obligation-an innovation  in the field of IP-is  that of most-favored-nation  (MFN)
treatment (Article  4).  This requires countries  to treat nationals  of any one country  no less favorably than nationals
of another  country. MFN has limited  significance  in the IP area as it is irrelevant once national treatment is
granted. MFN  becomes  operative  only  when  a country  is treating  nationals  of another  country  more  favorably
than  its own  nationals;  in such an event  MFN  becomes  necessary  to  prevent  discrimination  between  foreigners.
5and finally, it would prevent countries from requiring, under the threat of compulsory licensing, that
a patentee should "work" the invention locally (the latter amounts to a requirement that demand in a
market be met by local production  rather than through imports). Finally, while TRIPs does not specify
when a compulsory  license may be granted (except to disallow compulsory licenses  for non-working),
some important  conditions  are laid down that must be fulfilled when it is granted (Article 31).  Notable
among these  are the requirements  to establish  that normal channels  of obtaining  a voluntary license  have
proved unsuccessful (Article 31.(b)) and that the patentee be provided adequate compensation for a
compulsory license (Article 31.(h)).
To comply with TRIPs, Egypt will have to undertake extensive  reform of its patent laws in each
of the areas described above to protect pharmaceutical  products, plant varieties, and biotechnological
products, to increase the term of patent protection to 20 years, and to eliminate the discrimination in
the system of compulsory licensing against pharmaceutical inventions and against imported patented
products.
(c) Copyright and related rights:  Copyright protects the artistic and literary works of authors
(which includes  authors of books, music, and films). It protects the expression of ideas rather than the
ideas  themselves. The Berne  Convention is the most important  agreement in this area and contains  high
standards  of protection, including  a broad definition  of authorship and a term of protection  equal to the
lifetime of the author plus fifty years. Related rights protect the output of phonogram producers (i.e.,
the music industry), of performers, and of broadcasting organizations; protection for such rights is
embodied in the Rome Convention.
The TRIPs provisions on copyright and related rights will require adherence by all TRIPs
signatories to the Berne Convention, 1/ except for  its provision on  "moral rights".  In addition,
countries will have to protect computer programs and databases as literary works, establishing an
international  consensus  in this regard (Article 10). TRIPs will require the introduction of an exclusive
rental right-the  right to prevent unauthorized  rentals-for  computer programs and sound recordings,
and a conditional  rental right for films, where commercial  rental of films leads to widespread copying,
impairing the economic  benefits that accrue to the right holder (Article 11).  TRIPs also requires the
introduction of performers' rights, which is more limited than that found in the Rome Convention
(Article 14); however, a significant addition will be the extension of the term of protection of sound
recordings from 20 to 50 years (Article 14.5).
Although Egypt is a member of the Berne Convention, it will have to introduce legislation to
bring it into conformity  on all other scores mentioned in the previous paragraph.
(d) Integrated Circuits:  Protection for semi-conductor chips-the  basic building block of the
modern electronics industry-is  currently absent in  most countries.  Thus  Egypt like nearly all
developing countries will need to introduce laws to grant protection not just in accordance  with the
provisions of the unratified Washington Treaty (Article 35), but to go further in some important
respects.  These include increasing the term of protection for chips to  10 years (Article 38) and
tightening the conditions of compulsory licensing in conformity with TRIPs (Article 37.2).
1/  TRIPs also clarifies a provision  of the Berne Convention  by specifying  that where the creator of a work is a
corporation,  the term of protection  should  not be less than 50 years.
6Egypt will have to introduce  a system  for the protection  of integrated circuits as there is currently
no protection for this form of IPRs.
(f)  Undisclosed Information  and Test Data:  Prior to TRIPs, there were no clear international
rules concerning the protection of undisclosed  information or trade secrets (a good example of a trade
secret is the formula for producing Coca Cola).  Developing countries were reluctant to recognize  or
concede the principle that trade secrets were an IPR; in their view, trade secrets did not fulfil one of
the prerequisites of an IPR, namely, the obligation on  the part of the right holder to disclose the
"secret."  The main obligation under TRIPs in this regard is only to prevent the acquisition, use or
disclosure of information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices (Article 39).  This
feature is found, in one form or another, in most countries' laws on unfair competition, including that
of Egypt.
(g) Anti-competitive  practices and contractual licenses:  Developing countries' wariness of IP
protection stemmed from the belief that  monopolistic control over technology, facilitated by  IP
protection, would increase the price of and limit access to foreign technology, thereby impeding its
transfer and diffusion.  Strong IP protection was argued to strengthen the hands of foreign technology
owners in negotiations  with developing  country users over voluntary licenses. One way of redressing
this  monopoly power would be to prohibit certain practices that  are egregious manifestations of
monopoly control over technology. The TRIPs agreement  reflects developing  countries' concerns by:
(i) recognizing their right-that  they have always had-to  specify in their domestic legislation anti-
competitive licensing  practices or conditions that constitute an abusive use of IPRs (Article 40.2); (ii)
also recognizing  the right to take remedial measures against anti-competitive  practices as long as these
are consistent  with the Agreement; and (iii) obliging  countries to consult with each other and exchange
information in order to facilitate  the enforcement of national laws against companies whose activities
straddle borders (Articles 40.3 and 40.4).
(h) Enforcement: The TRIPs provisions on enforcement are unique in that they represent the
first set of comprehensive, multilateral rules not just in the area of IP, but in any area.  The broad
objectives  of the TRIPs enforcement  provisions embodied in Article 41 are twofold: to provide for the
effective  national enforcement of IP laws, while ensuring that enforcement does not become abusive
or overzealous,  creating non-tariff  barriers through harassment  of legitimate  trade. The most important
point to note about enforcement is that the basic responsibility or obligation of countries under the
TRIPs agreement is not to take action themselves to prevent infringing activity, but to put in place
procedures and remedies that enables right holders to do so.  Hence, the primary responsibility for
initiating action aimed at enforcement is left to private right holders.  The popular portrayal that the
mere fact of infringing activity in a country makes that country susceptible to  multilateral trade
sanctions is simply wrong.  A country can be successfully challenged in the WTO for  infringing
activity within its borders only if it can be shown that it has not fulfilled its obligations  under the TRIPs
agreement.
There are two types of enforcement obligations: those on procedures and those on outcomes.
The former include judicial, administrative, and criminal procedures, and related remedies that must
be available  under national law, (both internally and at the border) to right holders in order to prevent
infringing activity and to obtain redress in the event that such activity is taking place.  These
procedures and remedies  are too technical  to merit an elaborate  discussion  here.  In any event, the more
interesting  and difficult issue concerns the implied  obligations  on outcomes. Article 41.1 of the TRIPs
agreement specifies that enforcement must be expeditious, while Article 41.5 states that the TRIPs
agreement "does not create any obligation  to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement  of IP
7rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of
Members to enforce their law in general."  A key question that arises is whether the standards of
performance required of national courts and customs are absolute or relative.  The TRIPs agreement
does not provide a clear answer-part  of the constructive  ambiguity  that allows important international
agreements  to be negotiated.
If, on average, it takes 10 years for an IP case to move through national courts say, in Egypt,
would that constitute inexpeditious  and therefore ineffective enforcement for which Egypt could be
prosecuted  in the WTO by its trading partners? Would Egypt's case be weakened by the fact that the
equivalent figure is 2 years in the United States and the EU? Or could it invoke the fact that as a
developing  country, with limited administrative  resources  and capabilities, it cannot be held to the same
standards as Article 41.1 appears to support?  It was understood in the negotiations that, if such an
issue came up before a WTO panel, it would be reasonable to expect it to take into account the
objective  constraints  facing  a country in deciding whether it had met the obligations  to provide effective
and expeditious means of enforcement.  However, if a panel interpreted the TRIPs provisions as
implicitly mandating absolute standards  of performance, countries would simply have to devote extra
administrative and financial resources to fulfil international  requirements. A consequence  could be a
disparity in a country's domestic legal system because IP cases would be processed faster, owing to
international obligations, than cases in other areas.  Why should IP be so privileged?  Would such
precedence  be consistent with national priorities for the judicial system? These are uncharted waters
as far as the WTO goes, and a further clarification of the real commnitments  entailed by the TRIPs
enforcement might have to await future deliberations in the WTO.
For Egypt, the provisions on enforcement have raised some concern in the light of the lack of
administrative and financial resources available  to judicial and customs authorities.
(i) Dispute  settlement  and prevention: The new strengthened  WTO dispute settlement  procedures
that have emerged from the Uruguay Round apply to the TRIPs agreement. These procedures will be
faster because of strict time limits, and will provide for greater automaticity in the adoption of panel
recommendations  and their implementation  because  parties to a dispute can no longer block adoption.
There is also provision  for cross-retaliation,  subject to certain conditions  and multilateral  authorization.
Crucially, the TRIPs agreement  and the WTO dispute settlement  procedures would  constrain the future
use of unilateral measures. When members seek redress of a violation of a TRIPs or Uruguay  Round
obligation, or of any impediment  to the attainment of the obiective of the TRIPs agreement, they must
have recourse to and abide by multilateral dispute settlement  procedures. Any ruling or determination
to retaliate must be made in accordance with those procedures.  Thus, the commitment to eschew
Section  301-type unilateral actions would  appear to be broad as it potentially encompasses  not only the
TRIPs provisions themselves, but also matters related to the objectives of TRIPs.
(j) Transitional arrangements: Egypt like all developing  and least-developed  countries will have
to implement  the national treatment  and MFN provisions beginning  January 1, 1996. Other provisions
of the agreement, including those on  enforcement, introduction of plant  variety protection, and
protection for biotechnological  processes, will have to be implemented  by January 1, 2000 in the case
of Egypt (and developing  countries generally)  and 2006 in the case of least-developed  Asian countries.
Patent protection for biotechnological  products will have to be implemented  by 2005.
2.  The Egptian  situation in a key sector:pharmaceutical  and chemicals
8One of the most significant areas of impact  of the TRIPs agreement  will be the pharmaceuticals
sector. Research shows that proprietary rights in the form of patent protection are most important in
the case of pharmaceuticals  in ensuring that the returns from R&D are appropriated by the inventor
because of the relative ease of copying (Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield, 1986, 1994).  In other sectors
there are natural factors such as lead time, secrecy, increasing  returns to scale, and marketing that can
help prevent imitation  by competitors. In the case of pharmaceuticals,  legal protection is a key factor
in ensuring that competitors do not dilute the competitive edge of the firms that have undertaken the
R&D by cheaply or costlessly imitating the invention.
The size of the Egyptian pharmaceutical  market was some US$ 670 million in 1993, of which
a substantial  proportion is supplied by foreign companies. Based on evidence for other countries (See
Subramanian 1995a, 1995b), the effects of the TRIPs agreement on Egypt are extremely sensitive to
the  assumptions made about the  various market parameters.  Two parameters are of particular
importance. The first is the proportion of drugs that will be patented in the future, something that is
very difficult to predict.  According to data presented by the pharmaceutical industry (Gadbaw and
Richards 1988), almost 60 percent of current sales of drugs in developing countries would have been
patentable had these countries granted patent protection. If this is so, the effect of TRIPs will be large.
The second factor is the degree of competition on markets.  In the limiting case where the pre-patent
situation  is perfectly competitive  and the post-TRIPs  regime is a perfect monopoly, the impact of TRIPs
will be quite significant. If, on the other hand, the pre-patent situation is a duopoly with one foreign
and one domestic  producer, and the post-TRIPs regime is a monopoly with one foreign producer, the
impacts become less adverse. l/  Such calculations ignore potentially important dynamic benefits
stemming from TRIPs-induced  R&D effects. While the evidence on such effects is limited, a number
of studies have shown that IP protection is important in R&D decisions in the pharmaceutical and
chemical  sectors, but less so in other sectors (Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield 1986, 1994). In the future,
as developing countries come to account for a larger share of global sales, this may induce welfare-
enhancing R&D effects.
3.  Policy Issues
The policies adopted  by countries in the aftermath  of TRIPs should  be guided by their assessment
of the likely net benefits and costs.  If the assessment is negative or mixed, countries can consider the
policy options outlined below, aimed at mitigating any adverse impacts. However, such options would
not be appropriate if the assessment  were positive. When a country  has expectations  of sizable dynamic
gains, any attempt at minimizing adverse impacts could in fact reduce the chances of any real gains.
This is because the policies designed to minimize adverse effects are also likely to reduce profits, and
hence the incentives  for R&D and the transfer of technology.
1/  This is the model  analyzed  in Chin and Grossman  1988. Allowing,  more realistically,  for competition  between
patented therapeutic  classes and government  use of compulsory  licensing  to regulate a post-TRIPs  pharmaceutical
market, the adverse  effects  shrink further in magnitude. If, e.g., the situation  is assumed  to be a Bertrand  duopoly  in
the pre- and post-patent  situations,  with  one domestic  and one foreign  producer,  and the effect  of the TRIPs  agreement
is modelled  as forcing  an increase  in the cost of the domestic  producer  (due to royalty  payments  to pay to the foreign
patent holder), annual  welfare  losses  of US$  220 million  and price increases  in the order of only  2 percent to 3 percent
obtain for a country such as India (Subramanian,  1995a).  Maskus and Eby-Konan  (1994) calculate  the possible
economic  impacts  under other scenarios.
9There are some areas, notably in relation to pharmaceuticals, where opinion can be genuinely
divided on the merits of higher IP protection.  However, any impact of the TRIPs agreement will be
felt fully only in 2015--20 years after the implementation of the agreement--which should provide
sufficient time for adjustment.  But even in these areas, the TRIPs agreement does not foreclose the
entire range of policy options that can be deployed  by countries to mitigate its possible adverse  impacts.
First, while the TRIPs agreement  has significantly  limited the use of compulsory licensing  (which was,
for example, the preferred tool in Canada for regulating  drug prices), countries retain some discretion
in using this form of regulatory control.  Thus, two of the stringent conditions attached  to compulsory
licensing-the  need to demonstrate that the patent owner has refused to make available a voluntary
license  on  reasonable  commercial  terms  and  conditions,  and  the  criterion  of  adequate
compensation-can be waived if it can be shown that an IPR holder's actions have resulted in an anti-
competitive practice.  Hence, developing countries can, in their national competition laws, specify
standards of abuse, encompassing such outcomes as high prices.  Further, countries retain enough
latitude in determining where these standards could be set, for example, the point at which a price
would constitute  an abuse of the patent right.  In the event that these standards  are flouted, compulsory
licensing  could be used to redress the abuse and bring prices down to reasonable levels. 1/
Second, despite intensive efforts, demandeur countries were unable to obtain agreement on a
prohibition on exhaustion.  At stake in this issue was whether right holders could prevent parallel
imports and  sustain discriminating prices between markets.  In other words,  the prohibition of
exhaustion  would have permitted the patent holder to behave like a discriminating  monopolist.  The
absence of such a prohibition means that, at least in larger developing country markets, governments
retain the possibility of allowing parallel imports that would exert incipient pressure on prices and
prevent them from reaching levels  that a discriminating  monopolist  would have been able to maintain.
4.  Trade-Related  Investment  Measures (TRIMs)
TRIMs refer to a set of measures employed  usually, but not exclusively,  by developing  countries,
with a view to compelling  or inducing  foreign enterprises to meet certain yardsticks of performance.
Surveys have revealed that TRIMs tend to be concentrated  in specific industries--automotive,  chemical
and petrochemical,  computer  and informatics  .Local  content requirements  (LCRs)  are more frequent  than
export performance requirements (EPRs) in the automotive than in computer/informatics  industries.
In chemicals  and petrochemicals  both LCRS and EPRs are prominent (Low and Subramanian, 1995).
The Uruguay Round agreement essentially reaffirms existing GATT disciplines relating to
national treatment (Article III) and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (Article XI).  An
illustrative list  identifies two TRIMs--local content and  trade balancing requirements-- as being
inconsistent  with Article III, and three TRIMs--trade and foreign exchange  balancing restrictions and
domestic sales requirements--as  constituting QRs. The agreement requires the notification of WTO-
inconsistent TRIMs within ninety days of the WTO's entry into force.  A timetable for phasing out
these TRIMs is also specified. Industrial, developing, and the least developed countries are required
to phase out the GATT-inconsistent  TRIMs in two, five, and seven years, respectively.  Transition
periods can be extended for developing and  least developed countries if they  face difficulties in
eliminating TRIMs.  A standstill clause requires that existing TRIMs are not intensified during the
transition  period.  A special provision  permits the imposition  of TRIMs on new enterprises during the
1/  That the use of such compulsory  licensing  by governments  can reduce  the adverse  impacts was noted above.
10transition  period if that is deemed necessary  in order not to disadvantage  established  enterprises already
subject to TRIMs.  A TRIMs committee has been established to monitor the implementation  of the
Agreement.
Egypt eliminated certain requirements in 1994 under the Bank- and Fund-supported  adjustment
program.  However, it appears that  certain assembly industries must still meet a  local content
requirement  of up to 60 percent in order to obtain customs  duty reductions. This requirement  will have
to be eliminated as a result of the Round. It can also be noted that the five-year transition period will
only be available if existing TRIMs are notified in a timely manner to the WTO.
A  serious failure of the TRIMs agreement is that it does not address export performance
requirements.  Larger developing countries such as India resisted attempts to prohibit EPRs because
of their continuing  desire to extract export performance  from foreign  enterprises in return for the carrot
of entry into their large, protected  markets. Smaller, more open developing  countries, cognizant  of this
ability of large countries to divert investment  away from them, were correspondingly  more willing to
eliminate EPRs.  From the viewpoint of the WTO legal system, the disparate treatment of export
performance requirements, which are permitted, and their close cousins--export subsidies--which  are
prohibited (in manufacturing), is an unjustifiable anomaly.  In a larger sense, the TRIMs agreement
failed to address more important investment issues such as rights of establishment, national treatment,
investment  incentives, investor protection, etc.--the so-called  pure investment issues. There is a strong
case for negotiating  multilateral rules on investment (see Low 1994), which would benefit countries
such as Egypt in a number of ways.  First, participation in a international  agreement and binding its
liberal investment rules would send a strong signal about Egypt's commitment  to structural reform.
The second relates to the incentive side of investment regimes.  While it may be true that TRIMs are
falling increasingly  into disuse as governments  seek  to attract investment, it is likely also to follow that
governments will be more tempted to compete with each other in the incentives  they offer investors.
Governments may  feel forced to  participate in  this  costly and  distorting game,  even  if  basic
macroeconomic polices are sound and the political climate is conducive to  investment.  As with
subsidies in trade, investment incentives tend to distort the allocation of FDI, without necessarily
augmenting the total supply of investment, or doing so in an economically efficient manner.  The
possibility of controlling this kind of destructive competition  among countries' Finance Ministries is
perhaps one of the strongest arguments  for international  investment  rules.  1/  Developing  countries such
as Egypt will always be at a disadvantage if the relative attractiveness  of fiscal incentive packages in
different countries determines investment location decisions.
5.  Services
Egypt has a high level of specialization  in services trade.  Tourism, labor income (associated
with temporary labor movement)  and transport (fees of the Suez Channel) are large foreign exchange
earners.  Commercial service (non-factor)  exports stood at LE 8,082 million in 1994, as compared to
LE 3,854 million for exports of merchandise. Indeed, the large merchandise  trade deficit (LE -5,150
million) is too a large extent offset by the surplus in non-factor services. However, most of the non-
factor services receipts are accounted for by the Suez canal and tourism.  Many Egyptian service
industries are inefficient, with monopoly or oligopoly market structures being the norm.  A lack of
1/ Multilateral  rules that curb the use of incentives  to attract  investment  would  avoid a potential  negative
externality  and the attendant  welfare  loss at the international  level.
11competition  confronts users of services (agriculture, manufacturing,  consumers) with higher costs.  In
such cases allowing  and encouraging  greater inward  establishment  of foreign service providers, as well
as  greater  imports  of  services  through  temporary  movement  of  providers/demanders  or
telecommunications  networks, could do much to give Egyptian industry access  to lower cost and higher
quality service inputs.  The objective of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is to
encourage the opening of service markets to foreign competition.
1.  The GATS in a Nutshell 1/
The GATS consists of three main elements: (i) a set of general concepts, principles and rules
that apply to all measures affecting trade in services; (ii) specific commitments on national treatment
and market access; and (iii) a set of attachments, including  sectoral annexes. The Agreement applies
to four 'modes  of supply':  (i) cross-border supply of a service (i.e.,  not requiring the physical
movement of supplier or consumer);  (ii) provision involving  movement of the consumer  to the country
of the supplier; (iii) services sold in the territory of a Member by (legal) entities that have established
a commercial  presence there but originate in the territory of another Member; and (iv) provision of
services requiring the temporary movement of natural persons.  The Agreement does not apply to
services supplied in the exercise of governmental  functions.
The reach of MFN and national treatment  is less all-encompassing  in the GATS than under the
GATT.  MFN applies to all measures except those explicitly exempted by a Member.2/  National
treatment applies only to sectors listed in a country's schedule and its reach may be qualified.  The
GATS also introduces a commitment  not found in the GATT: a market access obligation.  Six types
of market  access  restrictions  are in principle prohibited. These consist  of limitations  on: (i) the number
of service suppliers allowed, (ii) the value of transactions  or assets, (iii) the total quantity of service
output, (iv) the number of natural persons that may be employed, (v) the type of legal entity through
which a service supplier is permitted to supply a service (e.g., branches vs. subsidiaries for banking),
and (vi) participation  of foreign capital in terms of a maximum  percentage  limit of foreign share holding
or the absolute  value of foreign investment. The introduction  of a market access commitment  reflects
one of the distinguishing  characteristics  of service markets: the fact that their contestability  is frequently
restricted by non-discriminatory measures.  Because national treatment and market access are not
general obligations  in the GATS  context, the schedules  of commitments  of Members  are very important
in determnining  the reach of the Agreement.
Other obligations address issues such as transparency, recognition of licenses and certification,
payments and transfers, domestic regulation and the behavior of public monopolies.  Article III
(Transparency) requires all  Members to establish inquiry points to  provide specific information
concerning any laws,  regulations, and administrative practices respecting services covered by  the
Agreement. Article  VI (Domestic  Regulation)  requires that Members  establish  disciplines  to ensure that
qualification requirements, technical standards and licensing procedures are based on objective and
transparent criteria,  are no more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the services
1/  This  section  and the next  draw heavily  on Hoekman  (1995b).
2/  MFN  exemptions  may  only  be made  upon  the entry  into  force  of the agreement.  Once  a Member,  further
exemptions  can only  be sought  by requesting  the Ministerial  Conference  of the WTO  for a waiver  (which  must
be approved  by  three  quarters  of the Members).  MFN  exemptions  are in  principle  to  last  no longer  than  ten  years
and  are subject  to negotiation  in  future  trade  liberalizing  rounds,  the first  of which  must  take  place  within  5  years
of the entry  into force  of the agreement.
12concerned,  and do not constitute a restriction on supply in themselves  (thereby possibly circumventing
a  specific commitment).  Article Xl  (Transfers and Payments) requires Members to refrain from
applying restrictions on international  transfers and payments for current transactions  relating to their
specific commitments.  Article VII (Recognition) allows for  the establishment of procedures for
(mutual) recognition of licenses, education, and/or experience  granted by a particular Member.  It is
noteworthy  in requiring  Members  to "afford  adequate  opportunity"  for other Members  to negotiate their
accession  to an existing bilateral or plurilateral recognition  agreement. Monopoly  or oligopoly supply
of services is allowed  under the GATS, but Governments  are required to ensure that such firms do not
abuse their market power to 'nullify' any specific commitments  relating to activities that fall outside
the scope of their exclusive rights.
Many of the framework's rules and disciplines  apply only to the extent specific commitments  are
made.  A good example is Article VI (Domestic Regulation) which requires that "all measures of
general  application  affecting trade in services are administered  in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner" but only "in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken" (GATT,  1994, p.  333,
emphasis added).  This is a serious shortcoming.  The MFN, national treatment and market access
obligations  of the GATS  do not extend to government  procurement  of services.  I/  This greatly  reduces
the coverage of the GATS as procurement  typically represents a significant share of total demand for
many services--e.g., professional services, consulting engineering,  and construction. The GATS also
does not impose general disciplines  on subsidy practices, only subjecting subsidies to the Agreement's
general obligations (i.e. transparency, MFN and dispute settlement). Negotiations are also called for
on this topic, the time frame to be determined  by a future work program.
2.  The Content of the Specific Commitments
To a very large extent the impact of the GATS depends on the commitments  that are made by
Members. Negotiators  chose to pursue a 'hybrid' of a positive and negative list approach to scheduling
specific commitments.  It is a positive list with respect to determining sectoral coverage of market
access and national treatment  commitments;  a negative list with regard to the maintenance  of measures
that violate either national treatment or the market access disciplines.  Each Member first decides
(negotiates) which service sectors will be subject to the GATS market access and national treatment
disciplines. It then decides (negotiates)  what measures will be kept in placefor that sector that violate
market access and/or national treatment, respectively.  Such limitations and exceptions must be
specified  for each of the four modes of supply. In addition to the specific  commitments,  countries also
make 'horizontal' commitments.  These usually consist of a  compilation of laws and policies that
restrict the use of a mode of supply by foreign suppliers, independent  of the sector involved. A policy
that is often  scheduled is an 'economic  needs' test--regulations  stipulating  that foreign service providers
may contest a market only if domestic providers do not exist, or are unable to satisfy demand.
1/  Negotiations  on this issue are to be initiated  within  two  years of the entry  into force of the WTO. The
revised  GATT  Govermnent  Procurement  Agreement  was expanded  to include  services. However,  this is a
plurilateral  agreement  that binds only  signatories. There  were 13 members,  mostly  OECD  countries,  at the
beginning  of the Round  (counting  the EU  as one). Egypt  is not a signatory.  See  Hoeknian  and  Mavroidis  (1995)
for a discussion.
13To assess the schedules, sectoral commitments of GATS Members were scaled by Hoekman
(1995) with a view to 'quantifying' two things:  (1) the extent to which measures have been bound; and
(2) the share of sectors where the binding relates to 'free trade'  (defined as the absence of market
access restrictions or limitations on national treatment). Each GATS Member's specific commitments
was entered into a spreadsheet (commitments  made as of April 1994 were considered in this exercise).
Two country  groups were created for comparison  purposes, one for 79 'developing countries', and one
for 18 high income countries ('HIC').  The 'developing country' group includes countries with a wide
range of per capita incomes and substantial variation in service market size (GDP).  Because  of their
relatively  low per capita incomes  this group includes a number  of East European transition  economies--
the Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland, Romania,  and the Slovak  Republic. Among the Arab countries,
the following had submitted offers by April 1994:  Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco and
Tunisia.  It is worth noting that currently there are accession working parties to the GATT and/or the
WTO for Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.  I/
Commitments were classified into three categories:  (1) 'None',  implying no restrictions are
applied on either  market access or national treatment  for a given mode of supply/sector; (2) 'Unbound',
meaning no policies are bound for a given mode of supply/sector; and (3) 'Other',  which in practice
implies that a sector is scheduled but that restrictions are listed.  To allow calculation of the sectoral
coverage of commitments, one of three numerical indicators (weights) was allocated to each of the
'cells' of a Member's schedule: a '1'  in all instances where 'None'  was stated in the schedule for a
sector/mode of supply (i.e., full market access/national  treatment is provided); a zero in all instances
where Member's list 'Unbound' for a sector/mode of supply; and 0.5 in all instances where specific
restrictions or limitations are listed for a sector/mode of supply.  The value of these indicators were
chosen so as to allow aggregation  across sectors and countries. The higher the number, the greater the
implied extent  of  openness-cum-binding.2/  Scaling  commitments of  'unbound'  as  zero,  and
commitments  where measures violating national treatment or market access were listed as 0.5 reflects
a perception that scheduling and binding has value, no matter how restrictive the policies that are
maintained. The value of 0.5 is arbitrary, and serves simply  to distinguish  commitments  from the other
two categories.
Market access (MA) and national treatment  (NT) coverage  ratios are reported in Table 6.  Three
indicators were calculated. First, the number of sector/mode of supply combinations (cells) where a
commitment  was made. Second, the 'average coverage' of the schedule  defined as the arithmetic  mean
of the scale factors allocated to each cell (0 for 'unbound', 0.5 for bound restrictions, and 1 for 'no
restrictions').  Third, the share of 'no restriction' commitments in (1) a Members total commitments
('count'); and (2) relative to the 155 possible sectors of the GATS classification  list.  The higher the
number, the more 'liberal' the country.
'HIC' members  made commitments  of some kind for 47.3 percent of the GATS list, as compared
to  11.2-19.7 percent for developing country groups, depending on their per capita income level.
Commitments made by large developing countries, arbitrarily defined as those with GDP of US $40
billion or more, were substantially  higher than the developing country average, accounting for 38.6
j/  Qatar and the United  Arab Emirates  submitted  schedules  in 1995  and  are not included  in the analysis.
2/  A value  of 1  for a sector/mode  of supply  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  foreign  service  providers  can freely
contest a  specific  market through a given mode of supply.  This depends  on the applicable  horizontal
commitments.  In all cases  where  a reference  is made  under  the temporary  entry  mode  of supply  to a horizontal
commitment  (restriction),  a value  of 0.5 was entered.
14percent of the GATS list.  The average coverage of MA commitments for the 'HIC'  group is 35.9 per
cent;  that  for  developing  country  groups  varies between  6.7  and  13.3 percent;  and  that  for  large
developing countries is 22.9 percent.  If these figures are related to the simple 'count'  of the number
of sectors where  commitments were made,  it can be observed  that 'HIC'  countries tend  to be more
liberal.  That is, the proportion of commitments implying either a '1'  (no restriction) or a 0.5 (some
restriction, but bound) is higher than for developing countries.  In Table 6 this can be seen in the third
row,  which divides the average 'coverage'  of commitments by the  'count'.  This  ratio for the large
developing country  group  is some  15 percentage  points lower  than  for the  'HIC'  group.  Some 57
percent of the 'HIC'  group's  commitments imply 'no restrictions',  as compared to 36.7 percent for the
group  of  large  developing  countries.  Table  6  also  reports  the  importance  of  'no  restriction'
commitments relative  to the GATS list (i.e.,  the maximum possible).  Such commitments  by 'HIC'
members account for 27.1 percent of the total.  For developing countries as a whole the figure ranges
from 4.7  to 9.8 percent; for the large developing country group  it is  14.9 percent.
Identical ratios were calculated for NT commitments.  A comparison of commitments on NT and
MA reveals that most countries tend to be more liberal with regard to national treatment. The last row
of Table 6 reports the magnitude of conunitments where  'no  restriction'  applies to both MA and NT
for a given sector/mode of supply.  The figure for 'HIC'  is 25 percent, and that for the other country
groups ranges from 4.4 to 9.5 percent.  These numbers vividly illustrate how far away GATS members
are from attaining 'free trade'  in services, and the magnitude of the task that remains.
A breakdown of specific commitments across regions is reported in Table 7.  It can be seen that
the Middle East and North Africa made greater commitments than Africa or South Asia, and does not
compare  very  badly  with  East  Asia.  However,  relative  to  Eastern  European  and  Central  Asian
countries, commitments were almost 3 times lower.  With respect to the Arab countries, the offers of
Algeria,  Bahrain and Tunisia  were more limited than the average offer of developing  countries as a
group.  Egypt,  as well  as  Kuwait and  Morocco,  made  commitments  that  can be characterized  as
somewhat more comprehensive than the average developing country (Table 8).  There is a fair amount
of variance as regards the sectoral coverage of the commitments (Table 9).  The fewest commitments
by HIC country groups  were made in sectors such as land,  water and air transport,  postal services,
basic telecoms, R&D, education, health, social, and recreation and social services.  Of these 'sensitive'
sectors, developing countries have a potential export interest in the last three, insofar as most 'personal'
services are included in these categories (none of which were scheduled).  But the coverage of business
services, computer-related services, and construction is quite high.  These sectors cover many activities
where developing  countries have an export potential.  The commitments of developing countries,  in
turn,  are only substantial in the area of hotel and restaurant services (that is tourism-related services).
The Arab  countries covered  in Table  8 also  follow this pattern,  although it is worth  noting that in
construction  and  financial services  these countries  as a group  scheduled  a higher  than  average (as
compared to the developing country group) number of service activities.
3.  Implications of the GATS for Egypt
In evaluating the impact of the GATS, one can focus on the following types of effects: (1) the
role of the GATS as an "anchor" for domestic policies; (2) the GATS as a mechanism to foster access
to  efficient  services  by  the  domestic  economy;  and  (3)  the benefits  of services  liberalization  for
domestic service exporters.  Effects (1) and (2) are basically determined by the coverage and degree
of liberalization  of the offers  made  by  Egypt  itself.  The  third  effect,  although  influenced by  the
country's  commitments, reflects the overall impact of the GATS agreement in reducing foreign market
access barriers.  The  "anchor" effect  is a conventional  by-product of participation  in a multilateral
15agreement.  By binding its policies in the GATS,  a government  will be in a better position to resist
demands from influential interest groups to alter these policies in the future.  The GATS imposes costs
on  "backsliding"--i.e.,  adopting  more  restrictive  policies  for  services  that are  bound--by  requiring
countries to negotiate the withdrawal of specific commitments.  In this context, even an offer to bind
the status quo has a value to the extent that it improves the transparency of the regulatory regime and
makes "backsliding" less likely.
Most of the potential gains associated with GATS membership will result from liberalizing access
to domestic service markets.  There is substantial evidence that many of the constraints that reduce the
economic efficiency of service industries in developing countries are "home grown, " in that appropriate
policies are not pursued  (UNCTAD and World Bank 1994).  Producer services (services that support
other business activities), in particular,  play a crucial role in the development prospects of any nation.
Losses of agricultural output due to poor transportation and the impact of substandard communication
networks on the costs of doing business are familiar examples in this context.  The evidence available
for Egypt suggests that services are higher cost and lower quality than those available to industries and
consumers  located in comparator countries (World Bank,  1995).
Efficient producer services are also fundamental for the pursuit of an outward-oriented strategy
of  development.  In  the  case  of  manufacturing,  for  example,  access  to  global  networks  in
communication and transportation is becoming a necessary condition for international competitiveness.
Products  are becoming  increasingly time  sensitive,  both because  of shorter  product  life-cycles  and
because of the pervasive use of 'just-in-time'  production management techniques. Foreign buyers must
be assured that a supplier can deliver to specification and on time.  The latter requirement in particular
may  be difficult to meet  if producer services  are of low quality or high  cost.  Inefficient  port  and
handling services, or high cost insurance--both due in part to a lack of competition--are examples of
services that may  impede export development.  Services liberalization provides  an effective way to
promote efficiency in producer services (Hoekman,  1995a).
The magnitude of the commitments made in the GATS by Egypt suggests that the Government
was not attracted by these benefits.  Overall, the immediate implications of the GATS agreement for
domestic service providers  are quite limited.  Egypt--the  Arab country with the highest  level of "no
restrictions" applied on market access and national treatment (see Table 8)--made commitments for less
than 20 percent of the service sector.  These commitments mostly consist of binding the status quo of
protection for the sectors scheduled.  The qualifications that are maintained are significant and include
limitations on the share of foreign personnel in foreign controlled enterprises (and even in the overall
wage bill in the case of maritime transport),  a maximum  of 49 percent of foreign capital in several
industries  (construction  and  related  engineering  services,  tourism  projects  in  the  Sinai  region,
insurance),  economic needs tests  in the case of tourism,  opening  of branches by foreign  banks and
insurance (e.g.,  new companies  should be  able to  work  without  "harmful"  competition  to existing
companies), restrictions  on the operations of representative offices, etc.  In part the limited nature of
the commitments  may reflect the fact that many of the services  in which  Egypt is likely to have or
develop a comparative advantage require movement of labor.  To the extent that this mode of supply
was  basically  kept  off  the  table  by  developed  countries,  the  "mercantilistic"  bargain  typical  of
multilateral negotiations--with export-oriented industries supporting domestic liberalization in exchange
for better market access abroad--was weakened in the case of services.  But such mercantilist arithmetic
is ill conceived, as non-liberalization is very costly to the domestic economy.
More needs to be done to open up  the service sector to greater competition,  thereby  granting
Egyptian  industry  access to  higher  quality  and  lower  cost  service  inputs.  The  average  nominal
16(unweighted) tariff  in  Egypt  is currently  around  30  percent.  The  import-weighted  average--which
provides a much more accurate view of nominal protection--is virtually identical (26 percent for goods
of EU origin; 29 percent for the rest of the world) (Table 10). The average effective rate of protection-
-taking into account how the structure of protection affects value added produced  in manufacturing--is
also some 30 percent, with some industries having effective rates that are higher than nominal ones,
and vice versa.  However, if account is taken of the fact that service inputs used by Egyptian industry
are less efficient and more costly than they might be (because of lack of competition), the magnitude
of effective protection declines substantially for all industries.  Indeed, for a number of them it becomes
negative,  implying that tariffs on imported  intermediate inputs combined with the implicit tariffs on
service inputs outweigh the tariff protection on the goods produced.  That is, the regulatory regime
results  in  the  effective taxation  of  Egyptian  industry.  This  is  the  case  for  8  industries,  mostly
agricultural  processing  and  natural  resource-based  activities  (oil/gas  and  other  extractive activities)
(Table 10).  As a result, the manufacturing average effective rate of protection falls to 14 percent.  This
illustrates the importance of taking into account service policies.
6.  Beyond the WTO: Alternative Routes Towards Further Liberalization
There are a variety of options for the Government  to liberalize trade  and investment regimes
further,  including unilateral action, multilateral  (WTO-based) liberalization based on reciprocity,  and
preferential or regional approaches.  For a small country such as Egypt that cannot influence its terms
of trade for most commnodities,  unilateral liberalization is welfare superior  to the other options.  If, in
the context of multilateral  negotiations, other countries reciprocate,  this will increase the gains from
unilateral  liberalization efforts.  However,  given the small country assumption,  there are few if any
gains to be expected from making liberalization  conditional upon reciprocity  by trading partners.  In
principle,  preferential liberalization through the negotiation of a FTA will also be an inferior strategy.
The reason is simple: the world market is always larger than a regional one.  By not discriminating
across potential trading partners,  domestic  firms  and consumers  will be allowed to buy  goods and
services from least cost suppliers, wherever  they are located.  By discriminating  in favor of specific
countries, the possibility arises of trade diversion--the elimination of tariffs for partner countries may
induce consumers and firms to source from less efficient suppliers located in a partner country,  rather
than from the least cost source of supply.  It may be the case that trade  creation--the elimination of
domestic sourcing  by firms and consumers  in favor of imports  of goods produced  by more efficient
suppliers in the partner country after the elimination of trade barriers--is sufficient to offset the welfare
loss caused by trade diversion.  The point, however, is that through unilateral liberalization such losses
do not occur, and the net gains are greater.
Egypt has been pursuing a gradual,  unilateral liberalization strategy.  Much of what was done
unilaterally in the past decade has been locked in through the WTO.  Implementation of the many WTO
agreements on matters such as product standards and customs valuation--not discussed in this paper (see
Hoekman,  1995a)--will ensure that the trade regime becomes more transparent.  Much remains to be
done, however.  Despite the general economic arguments against preferential trade liberalization,1/the
Government  is in the process  of negotiating a  EMA with the EU.  Abstracting from the  important
1/  A distinctive  feature in the EMA context is that Mediterranean  countries already have duty-free access  to
the EU for industrial  products.  The loss in tariff revenue associated  with a shift to free trade with the EU is
therefore asymmetric  (Panagariya, 1995).
17foreign policy dimension underlying such an agreement,  there are a number of possible reasons why
active pursuit of an EMA may make sense.  Five will be mentioned briefly. 1/
1.  Credibility  and dynamic gains  An EMA may offer a stronger  mechanism for  locking in
(anchoring) economic reforms than the WTO because it addresses policy areas that are not covered by
the WTO  at  all,  or where  WTO  disciplines  are weak.  For  example,  investment or  factor market
policies are  not addressed  by  the WTO.  Nor  is competition  (antitrust)  policy.  WTO  disciplines
pertaining to services policies are relatively  weak (see above).  The greater  credibility that may  be
associated with  a  RIA,  can  lead to  higher  dynamic  growth  effects  insofar  as more  investment  is
fostered, greater adjustment efforts are made, etc.
2.  Harmonization  An important element of an EMA may consist of harmonizing  regulatory
regimes  and  administrative  requirements  relating  to  product  standards,  testing  and  certification
procedures, mutual recognition agreements, common documents for customs clearance (e.g.,  the EU's
Single  Administrative  Document),  coordination  and  cooperation  on  linking  computer  systems  of
Customs,  etc.  These  are  areas  where  the WTO  is  restricted  to  general  principles  (i.e.,  national
treatment and MFN).  While such cooperative efforts can be pursued  unilaterally,  formal agreements
may be necessary to induce the administrative bodies involved to cooperate.
3.  Security of market access  A benefit of an EMA may be that it allows the countries involved
to agree to eliminate the possibility of imposing contingent protection,  such as antidumping  actions.
To the extent that a substantial share of total trade is with partner countries, such agreement could be
of great  value.  In the multilateral  context such an agreement  is unlikely to be feasible  in the near
future.  Harmonization of administrative  requirements and procedures may also help to improve the
security of market access.  An important area in this connection relates to product standards and their
enforcement.
4.  Transfers  Another  potential benefit of an EMA is that it may be associated with transfers.
Such transfers  may be  financial, or take the  form of technical assistance.  To  the extent  that such
transfers  are conditional upon membership of the RIA (i.e.,  are additiotnal), they will help offset the
possible losses associated with the implicit transfer of tariff revenue to the EU due to elimination of
tariffs and the costs  of trade diversion  more generally.  Additionality is important,  and much may
depend on how this is measured.  For example, Egypt already receives significant financial assistance
from the EU, both through bilateral official aid, and through the Financial Protocols that are negotiated
every 4 years under auspices of the Cooperation Agreements.  What matters in this connection is the
comparison  between  the  present  discounted  value  of  the  expected  transfers  under  status  quo
arrangements (Cooperation Agreements) and those that are expected under the new regime (the EMA).
Given the generally declining trend in official aid, and the emergence of Eastern European "claimants,"
taking past transfers  as the basis for an "additionality" test is probably unrealistic.
5.  Political  economy  Because of  political  considerations,  in this  case  the  foreign  policy
objectives of moving closer  to  Europe,  there  may be  a stronger  political constituency  for  regional
liberalization than for  MFN liberalization.  Hence, the chances of attaining liberalization,  albeit on a
preferential  basis. may be greater than for MFN liberalization.
I/  See Hoekman and Djankov ( 1995) for a more comprehensive  discussion.
18While these are all potentially powerful rationales for pursuing an EMA, much depends on the
contents of the  agreement.  In  particular,  comprehensive liberalization of  service markets and
investment  must be pursued. Without this, the opportunity  costs of preferential  liberalization  may well
be large. The best guarantee for an EMA to be welfare improving is if it is used as part of a deliberate
strategy to liberalize the economy more generally, i.e., on a most-favored-nation  (MFN) basis.  The
possible loss associated with a  EMA will be reduced if efforts are made to reduce trade barriers
confronting non-partner countries.  Adjustment costs associated with liberalization on an MFN basis
are not likely to be much higher than those emerging from regional liberalization with the EU.  The
offer of financial  and other assistance from the EU can then be used to facilitate  the transition path to
MFN reductions in trade barriers.  Stated otherwise,  the EMA may allow a government  to enhance  the
political feasibility of MFN liberalization. Very much depends in this connection on the willingness
of the government to state clearly that general, MFN liberalization of the trade regime is indeed its
objective. If this is not done, incentives  may easily be created for the formation of coalitions  between
EU and domestic firms that oppose further opening of the market to (more efficient) third country
suppliers.
It is in this connection  that Egypt's WTO membership and the results of the Uruguay  Round are
of great importance.  Commitments made in the Uruguay Round will not only help to move the
regulatory environment in Egypt closer to  what is envisaged by  the EMA and thus facilitate its
negotiation/implementation. More important is that the WTO offers a mechanism to reduce and bind
the level of protection on an MFN basis.  The EMA can be a very useful instrument to help plug some
of the holes in the WTO, and in the process facilitate  Egypt's participation in the discussions to further
expand its commitments  under the WTO.  The importance  of the latter cannot be overstated.
7.  Conclusion
The Uruguay Round will generally have a very limited impact on the policies of Egypt in the
areas of goods, investment, and services. The impact will be more significant in the area of intellectual
property, but even here the impact will be backloaded.  Insofar as this reflects a defensive attitude
toward liberalization  that will be maintained,  this does not bode well for an economy that will be facing
growing competitive  pressures as the world economy becomes  more integrated. However, the recent
initiatives  as regards moving towards free trade with the EU suggests that this is not the case. The task
ahead is to better explore the opportunities opened by the Uruguay Round in order to further more
liberal trade  policies.  The EMA  discussions provide  a  valuable opportunity to  expand such
liberalization,  but these in turn should provide a foundation for more general MFN-based reform.
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21Table 1:  Egypt: Indicators  of Import  Liberalization  under  the Uruguay  Round
A.  BINDINGS
Total Number of HS 4-digit Tariff Lines, December, 1994  1267
Agriculture  221
Industry  1046
Total number of HS 4-digit Tariff Lines Bound  1236
Agriculture  221
Industry  1015
Percent of HS 4-digit Tariff Lines Bound  97.6%
Agriculture  100.0%
Industry  97.1%
B.  TARIFF REDUCTIONS
Agriculture  Industry  Total
Average Final Bound Rate in 2005  . 61.7%  32.1%  37.0%
Average  Applied Rate, December 1984  56.4%  27.1%  32.0%
Average  Expected Applied  Rate, December 1995"  50.3%  21.2%  26.1%
Average "Water  in the Bound  Tariff", December 1995  2'  5.3%  5.0%  5.0%
Average  Expected "Water in the Bound Tariff,  December 1995  2v  11.4%  10.9%  10.9%
Number of Tariff lines Affected  by the Uruguay Round ("Affected
Imports")  31  36  192  228
as percent of total tariff lines  8.9%  10.1%  9.9%
Average  Tariff Reduction  on "Affected  Imports" V31  -9.4%  -11.3%  -11.0%
Average  Price Reduction  on "Affected  Imports" 1'  4  -4.8%  -6.7%  -6.4%
If the current program of reform is fully implemented.
v  Percentage  points.
This measures  the additional  liberalization  that will need  to be undertaken after the current reform program, and excludes
the textiles and clothing sector.  Thus, for these tariff lines, Uruguay Round bound rates in 2005 will be less than what
applied rates will be in December 1994 and 1995.
4/  Based on adjustments  that reflect the relations between actual duty collections and statutory tariff in Egypt.  Specifically.
the usual expression  for the percentage change in domestic price, dt/(  1  + t), was multiplied by the 2/3, where t represents
the statutory ad valorem tariff rate.
22Table  2:  Egypt:  Impact  of Uruguay  Round  on  Foods  Imports  (US  S  million)
1993/94  1998/99  2001/02
Baseline: With Uruguay  Round"
Wheat  342.3  380.9  411.1
Flour  82.3  88.6  93.8
Maize  247.6  286.1  313.0
Edible Oil  275.3  281.1  313.2
Sugar  149.8  186.6  209.1
Tea  97.4  129.3  148.9
Animal Fats  59.6  60.3  67.1
Total  1254.3  1412.8  1556.1
Scenario  1:  Without  Uruguay  Round  2
Wheat  342.3  378.6  406.3
Flour  82.3  88.1  92.7
Maize  247.6  284.4  309.3
Edible  Oil  275.3  281.9  315.0
Sugar  149.8  185.7  209.1
Tea  97.4  130.3  151.1
Animal  Fats  59.6  60.4  67.5
Total  1254.3  1409.5  1551.0
Incremental  effect  of the Round  3.3  5.1
as percent  of baseline  imports  0.2%  0.3%
Scenario  UI: Without Urumuav  Round  9
Wheat  342.3  373.8  395.9
Flour  82.3  87.0  90.3
Maize  247.6  280.8  301.4
Edible Oil  275.3  281.5  314.1
Sugar  149.8  183.2  203.4
Tea  97.4  130.2  150.8
Animal  Fats  59.6  60.4  67.3
Total  1254.3  1396.8  1523.3
Incremental  Effect of the Round  16.0  32.8
as percent  of baseline  imports  1.1%  2.1%
Based  on the World Economic  Outlook  (WEO)  projections. Under  Scenario  I (Ir), it is implicitly assumed  that the WEO projections  incorporate  the
incremental  price effects  due to the Uruguay  Round  that are based  on the assumption  in Scenario  I (11)  below.
2'  Based  on estimates  of changes  in the  world food  prices  estimated  by Goldin  and  van  der  Mensbrugghe  (1995)  on  the  assumption  that levels  of protection
in agriculture  in the absence  of the Round  would have  been  the average  level  between  1982  and 1993.
31  Based  on  estimates  of changes  in world food  prices  estimated  by Goldin  and van  der  Mensbrugghe  (1995)  on the assumption  that levels  of protection
in agriculture  in the absence  of the Round  would have  been  the average  level  between  1991  and 1993.
23Table 3:  Egypt:  Impact of EU's tarifT cuts  on Egypt's Non-Oil Exports to EU (in thousands of  1990-92  U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified)
SITC Code, Commodity  Average  Harmonized  Pre-Round  Post-Round  Percentage  Percentage  Import
value,  System (HS)  Tariffs  Tariffs  Change in  Type of  Change in  Change in  Demand
1990-92  Code  (percent)  (percent)  Price  Trade I/  Expon 2/  Exports  Elasticity
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
651  TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD  17153.3  52  8.44  6.51  -1.8%  Quota  54.9%  95015  -1.14
684  ALUMINUM  156103.0  26  0.00  0.00  0.0%  MFN  0.0%  0  -1.38
841 CLOTHING NOT OF FUR  56943.0  61  13.19  11.66  -1.4%  Quota  54.9%  31247  -3.92
652  COTTON FABRICS, WOVEN  43230.0  5208  10.00  8.00  -1.8%  Quota  54.9%  23727  -1.14
054  VEGETABLES FRESH ETC.  36250.3  07  11.24  8.33  -2.6%  MFN  3.0%  1072  -1.13
656  TEXTILE PRODUCTS, NES  21052.0  59 & 60  9.69  7.10  -2.4%  Quota  54.9%  11552  -3.92
263  COTTON  19179.7  5201.00  0.00  0.00  0.0%  MFN  0.0%  0  -1.14
561  FERTILIZERS, MANUFACTURED  16038.7  31  5.01  4.31  -0.7%  Preferential  .0.5%  -87  -0.81
677  IRON, STEEL WIRE EXCL WIRE ROD  13548.7  72  4.94  0.11  -4.6%  Preferential  -2.1S%  -283  -0.45
031  FISH FRESH, SIMPLY PRESERVED  10306.7  03  13.35  11.47  -1.7%  MFN  1.9%  193  -1.13
599  CIIEMICALS, NES  10196.3  28 & 29  7.04  4.47  -2.4%  Preferential  -1.9%  -199  -0.81
673  IRON AND STEEL SHAPES  10157.0  72  4.94  0.11  4.6%  Preferential  -2.1%  -212  -0.45
292  CRUDE VEGETABLE MATERIALS, NES  10100.3  14  0.19  0.00  -0.2%  MFN  0.2%  22  -1.13
055  VEGETABLES  PRESERVED, PREPARED  9843.3  07  11.24  8.33  -2.6%  MFN  3.0%  291  -1.13
671  PIG IRON, ETC  8342.7  72  4.94  0.11  -4.6%  Preferential  -2.1%  -174  -0.45
674  IRON, STEEL. PLATE, SHEET  7252.7  72  4.94  0.11  4.6%  Preferential  -2.1%  -152  -0.45
682  COPPER  6845.3  74  4.62  2  12  -2.4%  Preferential  -1.1%  -72  -0.44
051  FRUIT, FRESH NUTS, FRESH DRY  6712.0  08  11.62  8.66  -2.7%  MFN  3.0%  3201  -1.13
657  WIRE PRODUCTS, NON ELECTRICAL  6356.3  57  10.25  7.66  -2.3%  Quota  54.9%  3488  -3.92
693  WIRE PRODUCTS, NON ELECTRICAL  6355.0  74  4.62  2.12  -2.4%  Preferential  -0.8%  -50  -0.33
061  SUGAR AND HONEY  6343.0  17  14.00  9.98  -3.5%  MFN  4.0%  253  -1.33
678  IRON, STEEL, TUBES, PIPES, ETC  4880.7  73  6.04  0.99  4.8%  Preferential  -2.2%  -106  -0.45
042  RICE  4775.7  1006.10.00  330.00  211.00  -27.7%  MFN  31.3%  1493  -1.13
081  ANIMAL FEEDING STUFF  4699.3  23  1.97  1.37  -0.6%  MFN  0.7%  31  -1.13
551  ESSENTIAL OIL, PERFUME, ETC  3237.0  33  5.28  2,23  -2.9%  Preferential  -1.9%  -62  -0.66
221  OIL SEEDS, NUTS, KERNELS  3108.0  12  2.52  1.08  -1.4%  MFN  1.6%  49  -1.13
812  PLUMBING, ETC, EQUIP  2801.0  85 & 84  5.09  2.32  -2.6%  Preferential  -3.0%  -85  -1.15
893  ARTICLES OF PLASTIC, NES  2761.0  39  9.44  6.21  -3.0%  Preferentia)  -2.4%  -66  -0.81
861  INSTRUMENTS,  APPARATUS  2424.0  90  5.63  2.08  -3.4%  Preferential  -2.2%  -54  -0.66
Memorandum Items:
TOTAL EXPORTS  1251307.3
Total non-oil, non-gas exporns  711050
Total  Exports  covered  in analysis  663006
of which:
Preferential Exports  94840
MFN (non-quola) Exports  267421
Exports under quota  300745
Increase in Exports due to:
Quota Effect  165029
MFN tariff cut effect  3605
Preference erosion effect  -1601
Total  167033
Sources:  Exports in column (I)  from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.  Demand elasticities from Stern and others (1976).  Elasticities  for preference erosion  effects use merchandise imports as proponion  of
apparent consumption of  non-services GDP from World Bank, World Tables and IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
24Table 4:  Egypt:  Impact of U.S. tariff cuts on Egypt's non-Oil Exports to U.S.
(thousands of 1990-92  U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified)
Average  Harmonized  Pre-Round  Post-Round  Percentage  Percentage
value,  System (HS)  Tariffs  Tariffs  Change in  Type of  change in  Change in
SITC Code, Commodity  1990-92  Code  (percent)  (percent)  Price  Trade I/  Exports 2/  Exports
(1)  (2)  (4)  (5)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
641  CLOTHING, NOT FUR  53829  61  15.92  11.19  -4.1%  Quota  54.9%  29538
652  COTTON FABRICS,  WOVEN  18880  5208  8.44  6.51  -1.8%  Quota  54.9%  10360
651  TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD  14761  52  10.63  8.57  -1.9%  Quota  54.9%  8100
656  TEXTILE ETC PRODUCTS, NES  4757  59 & 60  10.24  4.93  -4.8%  Quota  54.9%  2611
292  CRUDE VEGETABLE  MATERIALS,  NES  4524  14  1.66  0.99  -0.7%  MFN  0.7%  34
657  FLOOR COVER, TAPESTRY, ETC  3994  57  6.11  2.80  -3.1%  Quota  54.9%  2192
075  SPICES  2095  09  1.21  0.70  -0.5%  MFN  0.6%  12
671  PIG IRON, ETC  1822  72  5.27  0.24  -4.8%  Preferential  -2.5%  -46
678  IRON, STEEL, TUBES, PIPES, ETC  1493  73  4.08  1.02  -2.9%  Preferential  -1.5%  -23
821  FURNITURE  1048  94  4.83  2.02  -2.7%  Preferential  -3.0%  -31
551  ESSENTIAL  OIL, PERFUME, ETC  827  33  2.13  1.12  -1.0%  Preferential  -0.8%  -6
054  VEGETABLES  FRESH, ETC  816  07  13.73  9.05  -4.1%  MFN  4.6%  38
553  PERFUME, COSMETICS, ETC  681  34  4.61  1.45  -3.0%  Preferential  -2.3%  -16
Memorandum Iterns:
TOTAL EXPORTS  262929
Total non-oil, non-gas, exports 114609
Total exports covered in analysis  109527
of which:
Preferential Exports  5871
MFN (non-quota) exports  7435
Exports under quota  96221
Increase in exports due to:
Quota effect  52800
MFN tariff cut effect  84
Preference erosion effect  -122
Total  52761
Sources: Exports in column (I) from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.  Demand elasticities from Stem and others (1976).  Elasticities for preference erosion
effects use merchandise imports as proportion of apparent consumption of non-services GDP from World Bank, World Tables and Economic Report -of the President (1995).
1/  MFN = change in trade due to MFN tariff cut by U.S.; preferential = change in trade due to preference erosion; quota = change in trade due to quota liberalization.
2/  For currently quota constrained items, the percentage change in exports represents the difference between the cumulative growth rate that would have prevailed under the
MFA and the cumulative growth rate resulting from the Round.
25Table  5:  Egypt:  Impact of Japan's  tariff cuts on Egypt's  Non-oil Exports to Japan
(thousands of  1990-92 U.S.  dollars unless otherwise  specified)
Average  Harmonized  Pre-Round  Post-Round  Percentage  Percentage
SITC Code, Commodity  value in  System (HS)  Tariffs  Tariffs  Change in  Type of  Change in  Change in
1990-92  Code  (percent)  (percent)  Price  Trade 1/  Exports  Exports
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
263  COTTON  27436  5201.00  0.00  0.00  0.0%  MFN  0.0%  0
671  PIG IRON, ETC  2804  72  5.34  0.26  -4.8%  MFN  6.8%  192
651 TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD  1803  52  6.75  4.56  -2.1%  MFN  2.3%  42
684  ALUMINUM  969  26  0.00  0.00  0.0%  Preferential  0.0%  0
719  MACHINES, NES, NONELECTRIC  810  84  3.64  0.00  -3.5%  Preferential  -0.7%  -6
657  FLOOR COVER, TAPESTRY, ETC  676  57  12.72  7.55  -4.6%  MFN  18.0%  122
677  IRON, STEEL WIRE EXCL. WIRE ROD  673  72  5.34  0.26  -4.8%  Preferential  -1.4%  -9
Memorandum hem:
TOTAL EXPORTS  65399
Total non-oil non-gas exports  38118
Total exports covered in analysis  35171
of which:
Preferential exports  2452
MFN exports  32719
Expons under quota  0
Increase in exports due to:
Quota effect  0
MFN tariff cut effect  356
Preference erosion effect  -15
Total  341
Sources:  Exports in column (1) from Untied Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.  Demand elasticities from Stern and others (1976).  Elasticities for preference erosion
effects use merchandise imports as proportion of apparent consumption of non-services GDP from World, World Tables.
1/ MFN = change in trade due to MFN tariff cut by Japan; preferential = change in trade due to preference erosion.
26Table 6: Sectoral  Coverage  of Specific Commitments  (percent)
HIC  LMIC  Low  Lower  Upper  I  Large
Income  Middle  Middle  Developing
Income  Income  Nations
Market Access (MA):
Unweighted  average  'count'(sectors-modes  listed as  a share  of  47.3  16.2  11.2  17.4  19.7  38.6
maximum  possible)
Average  coverage  (sectors-modes  listed  as  a share  of maximum  35.9  10.3  6.7  10.7  13.3  22.9
possible,  weighted  by openness/binding  factors)
Coverage/'count'  (average  coverage  as a share  of the average  count)  75.9  63.6  59.8  61.5  67.2  59.3
'No restrictions'  as a share  of total offer (unweighted  'count')  57.3  45.5  41.9  43.2  49.6  38.7
'No restrictions'  as a share  of maximum  possible  27.1  7.3  4.7  7.5  9.8  14.9
National  Treatment  (NT):  =_=
Unweighted  average  'count'(sectors-modes  listed  as a share  of  47.3  16.2  11.2  17.4  19.7  38.8
maximum  possible)
Average  coverage  (sectors-modes  listed  as  a share  of maximum  37.2  11.2  6.8  11.8  14.8  25.5
possible,  weighted  by openness/binding  factors)
Coverage/'count'  (average  coverage  as  a share  of average  count)  78.6  69.1  60.7  67.8  75.0  66.1
'No restrictions'  as  a share  of total offer (unweighted  'count')  65.1  58.0  48.8  57.5  62.8  52.3
'No restrictions'  as  a share  of maximum  possible  30.8  9.4  5.4  10.0  12.4  20.2
Memo items:
No restrictions  on MA and NT as a share  of maximum  possible  24.8  6.9  4.4  6.9  9.5  14.3
27Table  7:  Sectoral  Coverage  of  Developing  Country  Commitments  by  Region  (percent)
|  Africa  East  South  |  MENA  Eastern  |  Americas I Asia  Asia  Europe/  l
l  _______  I  ________  _________  ________  Central Asia
Market Access  (MA):
Unweighted average 'count'(sectors-modes  listed as a share of  9.0  24.2  10.2  15.6  33.8  15.7
maximum possible)
Average coverage (sectors-modes listed as a share of  6.1  14.6  4.1  8.2  24.1  9.8
maximum possible, weighted by openness/binding factors)
Coverage/'count'  (average coverage as a share of the average  67.6  60.6  40.2  52.8  71.4  61.9
count)
'No  restrictions' as a share of total offer (unweighted 'count')  50.0  39.5  17.1  37.1  52.4  46.3
'No restrictions'  as a share of maximum possible  4.5  9.6  1.7  5.8  17.7  7.3
National Treatment  (NT):
Unweighted average 'count'(sectors-modes  listed as a share of  9.0  24.2  10.2  15.6  33.8  15.7
maximum possible)
Average coverage (sectors-modes listed as a share of  6.7  15.0  4.5  9.2  23.2  10.1
maximum possible,  weighted by openness/binding factors)
Coverage/'count'  (average coverage as a share of average  74.5  62.0  44.6  58.8  68.8  63.9
count)
'No restrictions'  as a share of total offer (unweighted 'count')  64.6  50.8  31.3  49.4  70.2  52.8
'No  restrictions'  as a share of maximum possible  5.8  12.3  3.2  7.7  23.7  8.3
Memo items:
No restrictions on MA and NT as a share of maximum  4.4  8.0  1.7  5.7  17.4  6.8
possible
AM: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,  Uruguay, Venezuela
ECA: Czech Rep.,  Hungary, Poland,  Roniania, Slovak Rep., Turkey
SA: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
EA: China, Indonesia, Malaysia,  Philippines, Thailand, Korea
MNA: Algeria, Balirain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia
AFR: Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire,  Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal,  South Africa, Zimbabwe
28Table 8:  Sectoral Coverage  of Specific Commitments  (percent)
'HIC'  Members  All Other  Large  Selected
Countries  Developing  Arab Coun
Countries  tries
Algeria  Bahrain  Egypt  Kuwait  Morocco  Tunisia
Market Access (MA):  _
Average  'count'(sectors-modes  listed  as  a share  53.3  15.1  29.6  0.65  2.58  16.77  28.39  23.23  8.39
of GNS total)
Average  coverage  (sectors-modes  listed  as a  40.6  9.4  17.1  0.48  1.94  10.48  10.65  11.21  3.71
share  of GNS total, weighted  by openness  and
binding scale  factors)
Coverage/'count'  (average  coverage  as  a share  76.2  62.3  57,7  73.9  75.2  62.5  37.5  48.3  44.2
ol the  average  count)
'No restrictions' as  a share  of total offer made  56.4  47.3  36.7  75.0  75.0  47.1  25.0  28.5  23.1
(no scaling)
'No restrictions' as  a share  of GNS total  30.5  6.7  10.9  0.48  1.9  7.9  7.1  6.6  1.9
National Treatment (NT):
Average  'count'(sectors-modes  listed  as  a share  53.3  15.1  29.6  0.65  2.58  16.77  28.39  23.23  8.39
of GNS total)
Average  coverage  (sectors-modes  listed  as a  42.4  10.2  18.8  0.48  1.94  11.69  11.61  15.65  3.55
share  of GNS total, weighted  by openness  and
binding  scale  factors)
Coverage/'count'  (average  coverage  as  a share  79.5  67.5  63.5  73.9  75.2  69.7  40.9  67.4  42.3
of average  count)
'No restrictions' as  a share  of total offer made  65.1  60.4  49.3  75.0  75.0  61.5  28.4  64.6  40.4
(no scaling)
'No restrictions'  as a share  of GNS total  35.3  8.5  14.6  0.48  1.9  10.3  8.1  15.0  3.4
Memo  items:
No restrictions  on MA and NT as a share  of  28.0  6.4  10.0  0.48  1.9  7.9  7.1  6.5  1.5
GNS total
Source:  Compiled  by the authors  based  on GATT (1994).
29Table  9:  Commitments  by Sector
Scctor  (ISIC)  East  South  MNA  ECA  AM  AFR  HIC  HIC  HIC  Number of GATS
Asia  Asia  EUR  NA  Asia  sectors and modes
of supply
Construction  8.7  1.5  3.6  11.6  4.2  3.0  13.3  17.3  13.3  20
Motor Vehicle Repair  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.3  1.1  2.9  3.5  1.7  4
Wholesale  Trade  0.7  0.0  0.5  3.4  1.0  0.7  6.2  6.5  4.6  8
Retail Trade  0.7  0.0  0.3  4.3  1.5  1.0  6.3  6.5  4.4  8
Hotel/Restaurants  2.8  2.1  2.5  3.5  2.9  3.1  3.3  3.0  3.0  4
Land Transport  6.0  0.0  1.0  6.0  0.5  3.4  12.8  20.5  10.8  40
Water  Transport  9.5  0.0  1.3  7.5  0.4  2.2  3.1  1.8  6.8  48
Air Transport  2.3  0.0  1.0  6.0  0.6  0.6  5.6  4.8  3.2  20
Auxiliary Transport  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.7  0.0  7.8  7.8  4.6  20
Postal Services  0.6  0.0  0.7  2.4  1.3  0.7  0.8  3.3  1.7  4
Basic  Telecom  1.0  0.0  1.6  4.4  0.6  1.6  0.9  0.0  1.9  28
Value-added  Telecom  011.9  3.3  8.7  19.5  5.7  8.7  23.6  24.5  19.5  28
Financial Services  24.5  6.9  13.2  26.3  14.9  13.2'  38.5  41.8  32.6  60
Real Estate  Services  0.7  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.7  0.8  4.3  6.5  4.4  8
Rental  Activities  4.6  0.0  1.8  3.8  2.8  1.8  12.6  14.0  10.1  20
Computer-related  8.1  3.3  1.9  15.4  6.3  1.9  17.5  17.5  14.1  20
R&D Services  1.1  0.9  0.0  2.9  0.9  0.0  6.9  1.8  1.8  12
Business  Services  31.0  3.9  8.4  45.9  16.3  8.4  77.1  70.5  50.5  108
Refuse  Disposal  2.6  0.0  1.6  6.3  0.0  1.6  12.1  14.0  7.5  16
Education  1.0  0.0  0.8  10.5  1.2  0.8  6.4  3.3  4.7  20
Health and Social  1.2  2.0  1.3  5.1  1.5  1.3  7.6  1.5  3.0  24
Recreation/Culture  7.0  1.6  5.9  5.6  6.6  5.9  15.4  21.5  15.6  48
HIC-Asia: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore
HIC-NA: Canada, USA
HIC-EUR: EU-15, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland
AM: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
ECA: Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep., Turkey
SA: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
EA: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea
MNA: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia
AFR: Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe
30Table  10:  Nominal  and  Effective Protection  in Egypt
Effective  rates  of  protection
EU  Nominal  Import  Import  Current  Current  effective
Share  of  tariff  weighted  weighted  effective  rate  rate  ignoring  impact
imports  nominal  tariff  nominal  tariff  including  estimates  of  protection  in
apinst  EU  against  rest  of  servkes  services
of  the  world  protection
Animal products  83%  6%  9%  10%  -2%  3%
Chemicals  and products,  excl. petmleum  63%  13%  14%  13%  11%  26%
Clothing  12%  75%  59%  76%  43%  64%
Cotton ginning  nd  pressing  40%  12%  22%  6%  13%  31%
Cotton spinning  and weaving  57%  66%  28%  36%  43%  73%
Cnude petroleum  and natural  gas  63%  41%  13%  10%  -6%  4%
Food processing  26%  49%  12%  11%  -2%  2%
Fumiture  59%  25%  52%  64%  49%  56%
Glass  and products  35%  24%  35%  36%  13%  32%
Iron,  steel, other  base  metals  18%  9%  22%  24%  17%  36%
Leather  products  excl. shoes  62%  25%  40%  50%  47%  54%
Machinery and appliances  52%  11%  23%  28%  20%  29%
Minerl  products, n.e.i.  48%  27%  23%  22%  9%  21%
Other  extractive  industries  47%  18%  12%  7%  -26%  9%
Other nazafacturing  48%  11%  24%  27%  17%  31%
Paper and printing  45%  60%  18%  17%  9%  17%
Petroleum  refuing  43%  22%  12%  I0%  -6%  1%
Potcelain,  china,  pottery  16%  72%  49%  60%  31%  39%
Rubber, plastic and  products  34%  58%  21%  22%  9%  21%
Shoes  37%  24%  57%  91%  36%  44%
Transportation  equipment  33%  33%  47%  55%  42%  92%
Vegetable  products,  foodstuffs  12%  4%  8%  3%  -2%  21%
Vegetable  products,  non-foodstuffs  37%  9%  12%  7%  -2%  17%
Wood. wood  products,  excl. furniture  40%  11%  13%  14%  -8%  9%
TOTAL  42%  29%  26%  29%  14%  30%
Note  The data  have been adjusted  to take  into account  the fact that extensive  exemptions  are  granted to  importers  for imports of  capital goods  and cenain  intermediate inputs.  The vector of  nominal
tariffs  was adjusted  downward  for such  goods  by the proponion  with which actual collected  total tariff revenue  falls short of  'predicted'  tariff revenue,  i.e.,  what would  be collected in the absence  of
exemptions.  Alcoholic  beverages and  tobacco  products are excluded  in the  analysis given  extremely  high nominal  rates of  protection/taxation.  The  1990 input-output  table  was used,  adjusted  to reflect
1994 aggregate  output.  Trade  data for  1994 were  obtained from  the UN Comirade  database.  To  allow for the fact  that over time a mix of  trade creation  and trade diversion effects  Will increase the
slure  of  the EUl  m  total  itttlitlos ol  Egypt,  ianil  reductions  incorporate a detnitid  elasticity  effect (the elasticity  was set  at 2).  As  a result, the EU  share  increases  from 42 percent  in  1994  to (4 percent  at
the end of  the transittot.  Because no intiomiatiot  is available on die  tisagnitude of  the implicit  protection granted  to services,  the following  'tariffequivalents'  were used  to calculate effective  rates:
construction,  communications,  financial  services,  business  and professional  services:  20 percent:  for distribution,  transport,  storage: 40 percent.
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